In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation constraint, according to which for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ for the reason that p. However, the argument goes, it is not possible to act (or not to act) for a reason (...) for a reason. Therefore, he concludes, there are no second-order reasons. In this paper, I shall argue that Whiting's argument ought to be rejected. Thus, I will argue that we should not accept the motivation constraint on which it is based. It is true that for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ guided in the right way by the consideration that p favours you ϕing. However, I shall argue that it is possible for exclusionary reasons to guide us in the right way, even if it not possible for us to not to ϕ for a reason for a reason. (shrink)

There are reasons to believe that conventional obligations are impossible. Thus, it could be argued that for me to have an obligation to Φ in virtue of the fact that a convention so requires, it must be the case that I have a convention-independent obligation to do something else such that, given the existence of the convention, Φing is a way of doing just that. But, then, my obligation to Φ would not really be conventional at all. On closer inspection, (...) so-called conventional obligations turn out to be no more than a specification of what our nonconventional obligations require given the circumstances. In this paper, I shall argue that contra to what this argument suggests, there can be genuinely conventional obligations. To do so, I develop a second-personal account of conventional obligations, according to which obligations are grounded by conventions in virtue of an explanation that does not follow the indicated pattern. (shrink)

En este trabajo, analizo críticamente la tesis de Nino según la cual el valor epistémico de la democracia soluciona la paradoja de la superfluidad del derecho. En este sentido, examino dos cuestiones. Primero, si el valor epistémico de la democracia es una razón para creer que tenemos razones para actuar de conformidad con las leyes democráticas. Segundo, si el valor epistémico de la democracia es una razón para actuar de conformidad con las leyes democráticas independientemente de los méritos del caso (...) y, en su caso, si ello explica adecuadamente la normatividad del derecho. In this paper I critically analyse Nino’s thesis according to which the epistemic value of democracy solves the paradox of the superfluousness of law. In this regard, I address two issues. First, if the epistemic value of democracy is a reason to believe that we have reasons to act in conformity with democratic laws. Second, if the epistemic value of democracy is a reason to act in conformity with democratic laws independently of the merits of the case and, in that case, if that can adequately explain the normativity of law. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino el concepto de normas permisivas y la distinción entre permisos débiles y permisos fuertes. En primer lugar, explico la distinción entre permisos débiles y fuertes, tal como fue presentada por Alchourrón y Bulygin. En segundo lugar, reconstruyo los argumentos de Alf Ross contra la noción de "normas permisivas", los que implícitamente socavan tal distinción. En tercer lugar, analizo las respuestas de Alchourrón y Bulygin a las objeciones de Ross, y sostengo que, en última instancia, no son (...) satisfactorias. La conclusión es que, a menos que se aduzcan otras razones, el concepto de normas permisivas y, por lo tanto, la distinción entre permisos débiles y fuertes, debería abandonarse. In this paper, I examine the concept of permissive norms and the distinction between weak and strong permissions. First, I explain the difference between weak and strong permissions as given by Alchourrón and Bulygin. Second, I reconstruct Alf Ross' arguments against the very notion of "permissive norms", which implicitly undermine the aforementioned distinction. Third, I analyse Alchourrón and Bulygin's answers to Ross' objections and claim that these answers are not satisfactory. My conclusion is that, unless other reasons are presented, the concept of permissive norms and the distinction between weak and strong permissions, should be abandoned. (shrink)